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The labor force participation of older men has been falling for several decades.  While there
is some controversy over whether the decline began as early as the late 1800s or as late as the late
1930s, the decline since the 1930s has been dramatic.  The labor force participation rate of men 65
and over fell from 54.0% in 1930 to about 19.3% in 1980.
1  Economists have devoted considerable
attention to trying to explain the trend towards earlier retirement over recent decades – mainly
since the 1970s.  Much of the focus has been on Social Security, but many papers have found it has
a small or negligible role.
2  Other researchers have argued that the proliferation of defined benefit
pension plans create strong incentives for older workers to withdraw from the labor force.
3
However, while Social Security benefits and private pensions are the main source of
income for the elderly today, another public transfer program dwarfed Social Security before 1950.
Old Age Assistance (OAA) was a means-tested program for people 65 and older established by the
same 1935 legislation that created Social Security.  By 1940, 22% of the aged population was
receiving OAA – an extremely high recipiency rate by the standards of today’s welfare programs.
4
Social Security payouts began to exceed those from OAA only during the 1950s.
5  Thus, the
heyday of OAA coincides with the early stages of the modern decline in elderly labor force
participation and may have played a significant role.
In later years OAA gradually shrunk and was replaced in 1974 by the current Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program.  The scope of SSI is not nearly as broad as Social Security, but
SSI remains the primary source of support for the poorest elderly today.  However, lacking studies
of SSI’s impact on labor force participation, little can be said about the potential consequences of
                                               
1  Parsons (1991), from Durand (1948).
2  Hurd and Boskin (1981) is notable in finding a substantial effect of Social Security on retirement using data
from the early 1970s.  Lumsdaine and Wise (1994) concluded, however, that most of the large literature in the
1980s "attribute only a modest portion of the early retirement trend to the effect of Social Security provision."
3  Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987), Stock and Wise (1990).
4  In 1994, by comparison, 4.5% of the population aged 65 and over received Supplemental Security Income, and
12.8% of the population 19 and under received Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
5  Lumsdaine and Wise (1994) reported that Social Security recipiency among those 65 and over grew from about
20% in 1940 to 60% in 1950 and 90% in 1960, while the replacement rate fell during the 1940s to 20% in 1950
and rose to 30% in 1960.  Pension coverage rose from about 24% in 1950 to 40% in 1960.3
recent retrenchments in the SSI program.
6,7  It is difficult to predict the extent to which cuts in
eligibility or benefits would be met by increases in labor supply among potential recipients, rather
than reductions in elderly income and/or increases in community and family support.
A distinctive feature of OAA was that states set benefit levels.  In contrast, Social Security
and SSI, the other social insurance programs for the elderly, are federally administered, which
makes identification of behavioral responses difficult.
8  The response to changes over time in
program rules may be confounded with other factors that influenced labor supply.  That may
explain Moffitt’s (1987) findings that much of the time series correlation between rising Social
Security benefits and rising retirement rates appears spurious.
9  Furthermore, everyone faces the
same rules at a point in time, which makes the variation in actual benefits across individuals
problematic.  As Bound (1989) noted, Social Security benefits are a positive but declining function
of past earnings.  This makes it difficult to identify whether a high replacement rate or low current
earnings, which are likely to be correlated with low past earnings, are driving observed retirement
behavior.
10
Studying OAA makes it easier to understand how benefit levels – which varied across
states at a point in time and also within states over time – are related to changes in labor supply.
The cross-state variation in OAA benefits also makes it possible to distinguish its impact from that
of the early Social Security program.  This strategy is quite different from the structural modeling
approach that many papers use to analyze retirement.
11  Structural estimates can be used to make
detailed predictions about a wide range of policy changes; however, the results depend crucially on
                                               
6  Research has focused on the determinants of SSI recipiency, as in McGarry (1996) and Yelowitz (1996).
7  The 1996 welfare reform made noncitizens ineligible for SSI.  Another 1996 proposal to transform federal SSI
expenditures into block grants for states was not adopted, but portends future pressure for cuts in eligibility or
benefits.
8  About half of states supplement SSI, but the median monthly supplement is less than $50.
9  Stewart (1995), on the other hand, found a significant relationship using time series data.  Most other studies
have employed cross-sectional or longitudinal data.
10  In the case of SSI, eligibility and benefits depend inversely on current income and wealth, which might be
endogenously determined with current labor supply.
11  The most recent example of the highly structural approach to modeling and estimating the retirement decision
is Rust and Phelan (1997).4
identifying the underlying behavioral responses.  The alternative approach of focusing on reduced
form estimates of the response to policy changes has yielded insights into a range of contemporary
public programs.
12
In sum, the aim of studying Old Age Assistance is twofold:  understanding the role of OAA
in explaining early retirement trends, and exploring how means tested benefits affected retirement
behavior in the past.  The present day applicability of these labor supply estimates cannot be
directly inferred from this work.  Major changes in the health status, wealth, and annuitization of
post-retirement income make for very different living and working conditions for older individuals
today.  Nonetheless, research on OAA offers a unique and potentially relevant perspective.
My approach in this paper is to use the rich individual level data available from the 1940
and 1950 Censuses to estimate the impact of OAA benefit levels on labor force participation.
Parsons (1991) also analyzed the impact of OAA.  He estimated that 50% of the increase in
retirement rates between 1930 and 1950 could be attributed to OAA.  By including 1930,
however, Parsons was compelled to use aggregated state level data because individual records
from the 1930 Census are not available.  Using individual level data instead makes it easier to
control for personal characteristics correlated with labor supply and to study how OAA affects
individuals with different characteristics.  The Census data is still limited, though, because it does
not include information on actual or potential OAA benefits.  The available OAA data are average
state level benefits.
13  Nevertheless, controlling for individual covariates, state and year fixed
effects, and state level measures of economic prosperity, I estimate a strong negative effect of
OAA.  If OAA benefits had not been raised during the 1940s, participation rates would have risen
slightly instead of falling, as strong economic growth was encouraging people to work longer.
                                               
12  See, for example, Moffitt (1994) on AFDC and marriage, Meyer (1990) on unemployment insurance and the
duration of unemployment, Krueger (1990) on worker’s compensation and the duration of work absences, and
Gruber (1996) on Canadian provincial disability insurance and labor force participation.
13  Papers analyzing the response to policy changes often use, as an independent variable, the maximum benefit
available in a jurisdiction, perhaps tailored to an individual’s family structure or employment history.  The
available OAA data is not rich enough for that approach.  In the next section I explain why the average benefit
does not appear to be endogenous with the dependent variable.5
These results are broadly in line with Costa (1995), who estimated a sizable income elasticity of
retirement at the turn of the century, also based on policy variation affecting the incentive to retire.
The rest of this paper consists of five sections.  Section I describes the OAA program,
Section II reports trends in labor force participation, and Section III discusses the empirical
approach and data.  Section IV analyzes the estimates and presents evidence against the possible
endogeneity of state benefits.  Section V concludes.
I.  OLD AGE ASSISTANCE
This section describes OAA benefits and recipiency rates and then discusses the available
administrative data on OAA.  By 1934, twenty-seven states had instituted assistance for the
elderly, offering average annual benefits of $174 to 235,000 recipients.
14  The federal government
took up the reins of welfare provision with the Social Security Act of 1935.  Besides establishing
Social Security, it mandated that each state initiate aid for the needy elderly, dependent children,
and blind.  By 1940, every state had set up an Old Age Assistance program.  The federal
government matched state benefits of up to $40 per recipient per month with an additional 50%
contribution.
OAA grew rapidly, as Table 1 shows.
15  By 1940 fully 21.8% of the population 65 and
over, 2 million individuals, were receiving OAA.  The average nationwide benefit in 1940 was
$241, or $737 in 1990 terms.  OAA benefits were quite generous relative to 1940 per capita
income of $595.
16  Benefit levels varied considerably across states, ranging from $91 in Arkansas
to $455 in California, with a standard deviation of $92.  Recipiency rates ranged from 8.1% in
Washington DC and 11.2% in New Jersey to 50.2% in Oklahoma, with a standard deviation of
7.9%.
 TABLE 1
                                               
14  Monthly Labor Review, 1936.
15  Appendix Table 1 details OAA benefits and recipiency rates by state.
16  In comparison, the average aged SSI benefit was $2724 in 1992, relative to per capita income of $22,958.6
Old Age Assistance Benefits and Recipiency
National average Standard deviation across states
1940
Annual benefit $241 $92
Recipiency rate 21.8% 7.9%
1950
Annual benefit, 1940 dollars $289 $93
   Increase from 1940 19.7% 27.0%
Recipiency rate 22.7% 13.4%
The average annual benefit is total annual transfers divided by number of recipients. The recipiency rate is
number of recipients divided by the population 65 and over.  The standard deviations across states are weighted
by state population.  Source:  Social Security Bulletin, June 1940 and June 1950.
In 1950, the national average benefit had risen 19.7% to $289 in 1940 dollars.  Most of the
increases occurred shortly after the federal government raised the matching rate in 1946 to 75%
for the first $20 per month from the state and 50% for the next $30.  The correlation between the
change in benefit and the 1940 level was -0.50, so states with relatively low 1940 benefits, such as
Texas and Florida, generally raised benefits the most.  The rate of benefit growth varied
considerably across states, with a standard deviation of 27.0% – which is key for the econometric
analysis in this paper.  The change in benefit levels within a state between 1940 and 1950, as it is
correlated with the change in labor force participation, will be used to determine the effect of OAA
on labor supply.
Recipiency should rise with benefits if benefits are to affect labor supply.  In Table 2 state
level recipiency rates are regressed on log benefits, state and year fixed effects, and measures of
economic activity.  Benefit changes within states during the decade had a significant positive
impact on recipiency rates, with a 10% rise in benefits leading to almost a two percentage point
increase in recipiency.  At the same time, growing economic prosperity – rising manufacturing7




The Impact of Benefits on Recipiency
Dependent variable:  Recipiency rate
Log annual OAA benefit  0.170
 (0.071)
State manufacturing value added per capita ($1,000) -0.323
(0.187)
State average farm value ($1,000) -0.009
(0.005)
Log state per capita income  0.100
 (0.103)




State and year effects are included.  Observations are weighted by state population.  The recipiency rate and
annual OAA benefit are defined in the notes to Table 1.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  N=98.
Information about the people receiving OAA is available only from occasional studies in the
Social Security Bulletin.  Fisher (1946) described the characteristics of OAA recipients in twenty-
one states in 1944.
18  The median age of recipients was 74.1, compared to 70.3 for Social Security
recipients.  53% of OAA recipients were women.
19  OAA recipients, especially women, were less
likely to be married than the rest of the elderly population.  9.2% of OAA recipients were
nonwhite, though nonwhites accounted for 6.7% of the total elderly population.
                                               
17  The coefficient on log per capita income has an unexpected positive sign but is statistically insignificant.
Sample statistics of state level covariates appear in Appendix Table 4.
18  The article does not mention which states were included in the study.  These occasional studies are the only
source of information on recipients because the Censuses did not ask if individuals received assistance.
19  Roughly three-quarters of elderly SSI recipients today are women, in contrast.8
OAA benefit levels were determined by subtracting an applicant's income from what was
called a monthly budget, or standard living requirement as a function of family size.  This implies a
100% tax rate on benefits as earnings rose – a severe penalty against work.  However, data on the
maximum benefits were not regularly reported in the Social Security Bulletin.
 20  Program
generosity can instead be inferred from a state’s average payout per recipient, reported monthly.
Using this measure of average generosity will preclude decomposing estimates of the average
treatment effect into income and substitution elasticities.  A more serious problem might arise,
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where i indexes a state’s OAA recipients, N is the number of recipients,BS
max is the state’s
maximum benefit,Y Si is the income of a recipient, and Y S is the statewide average income of
recipients.  The problem is that differences in  B  across states will reflect not only statutory
changes in B
max, but also differences in recipients’ income, which is a function of individual
behavior.  This would not cause trouble if the regression of labor force participation on average
benefits includes state and year fixed effects – unless income moved differently across states.  For
instance, low income people in one state might have become better off relative to another state –
which raises Y  and lowers  B  without a change in program rules.  If changes in income
distribution were also correlated with changes in labor force participation, then an inconsistent
estimate of the program’s effect on participation would arise.
21
                                               
20  Data on maximum benefit levels were reported for eighteen states in Berman (1947) and eleven states in
Berman (1949).  These reported maximum levels had a negative but insignificant impact on labor force
participation between 1940 and 1950.
21  The bias might go in either direction.  If rising labor force participation raised earnings for the poor elderly, it
would appear that falling benefits caused rising participation.  If rising income led children to contribute more to
support their parents, which induced them to retire, it would appear that falling benefits caused falling
participation.  The Censuses have neither complete nor comparable information on income to study changes in
elderly income distribution.  Instead, trends must be inferred from published data on state per capita income for9
However, actual patterns of benefit levels, participation, and average income suggest that
this potential source of spurious benefit changes is not a major problem.  Average benefits  B  rose
between 1940 and 1950.  If trends in income Y  influenced  B  more than statutory changes in B
max
did, it must be that income among the poor elderly fell.  However, per capita income rose
substantially during the decade, as did other measures of economic activity reported in Appendix
Table 4.  Moreover, rising average benefits and rising state per capita income were positively
correlated, so in states that grew richer overall the poor elderly would have had to grow
systematically poorer, raising  B , if changes in Y  were driving changes in  B ; if not, then increases
in statutory benefit levels were dominating changes in  B .  Lastly, as demonstrated in Section IV,
increases in per capita income and other measures of the economy were associated with increases
in labor force participation among the elderly – which should channel through to lower average
benefits.  In sum, average benefits rose even while income and participation were rising.
Therefore, it does not appear that the average benefit measure  B  was seriously contaminated by
changes in income distribution correlated with labor force participation, but rather that changes in
statutory benefit levels drove benefit changes.
Another potentially important rule governs the treatment of migrants.  If people retired and
then chose to move to high benefit states, the effect of benefits on retirement would be
overestimated.  Federal law prevented states from requiring more than one year of in-state
residence preceding application, but did allow them to require up to five years’ residence within the
last nine.  The Social Security Bulletin (1944) noted that the great majority of states imposed the
maximum requirements, which limits the extent of benefit-driven migration, though many states did
reduce the requirement to one year by 1950.  Furthermore, cross-state migration among the elderly
was low.  In the 1950 Census sample of men aged 66-75 used in this paper, 1.0% had moved to a
new state in the past year.  Among those, slightly more than half moved to states with lower 1950
benefits than their own.  Lastly, even with a more mobile population today, Walker (1994) found
                                                                                                                                                        
the entire population.10
that differential AFDC benefits could not explain migration to neighboring states by poor young
women.  Therefore, it does not appear likely that OAA benefits drove migration.
22
II.  LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF THE AGED
This paper focuses on explaining the variation across states in labor force participation
trends between 1940 and 1950.  An alternative strategy would study the labor supply response to
OAA’s introduction in the 1930s.  However, there are two reasons for emphasizing the 1940s
instead.  First, only state level aggregates are available from the 1930 Census.  In contrast,
individual records from the 1940 and 1950 Censuses make it easier to control for characteristics
like age structure, education, and household composition that are likely to be correlated with labor
supply and perhaps with factors affecting benefit levels.  It also makes it possible to analyze the
impact of such characteristics on participation and on the sensitivity of participation to OAA.
Another reason to focus on 1940 and later is because labor force participation before 1940
was measured differently.  The Census used to ask whether respondents were "gainfully
employed".  New questions beginning in 1940 corresponded to the modern economic concept of
participation.  Various approaches that adjust downward the pre-1940 gainful employment series
to match the later participation data are controversial and leave the series with a sharp decline
between 1930 and 1940.
23  Such a decline is not surprising in light of the Great Depression, but it
is difficult to know how much of the measured drop was driven by economic forces, as opposed to
the statistical break in the data series.
24
                                               
22  An additional concern about the OAA data is that benefits sometimes fluctuated when local governments
temporarily ran short of funds, especially in those states where counties contributed to OAA funding.  This could
make the average benefit measure a less accurate indicator of actual benefits at a point in time, and it might have
reduced responsive to OAA of people in those jurisdictions.  However, in her study of OAA’s impact on living
arrangements, Costa (1997) found that the coefficient estimate on a dummy for whether counties helped finance
OAA was insignificant and small.
23  Durand (1948) developed sex and age factors to adjust the gainful employment series.  His participation rate
for men 65 and over was 54.0% in 1930 and 42.2% in 1940.  Ransom and Sutch (1988) made adjustments based
on how questions were asked and enumerators instructed each year, though this was disputed by Moen (1987).
Their participation rate was 53.9% in 1930 and 49.1% in 1937.
24  In a regression with 1930 participation data, a year effect would absorb the break only if the data were11
On the other hand, during the 1940s there was little change in the national labor force
participation rate, which appears to make it a less promising time period to study.  World War II
drew or kept many older people in the labor force, although it is less clear what happened to
retirement patterns after the war.
25  For the sample of 66 to 75 year old men used in this paper, as




Labor Force Participation, Men Aged 66-75
National average Standard deviation across states
1940 49.7% 6.0%
1950 48.7% 6.2%
  Change from 1940 -1.0 5.6
Sample:  Male citizens aged 66-75, not in group quarters, from the IPUMS of the 1940 and 1950 Censuses.
Labor force participants are those at work or unemployed last week.  Person weights from the IPUMS make the
averages nationally representative.  The standard deviations across states are weighted by state population.
However, the small change in the national average masks considerable variation across
states in each year and especially within states between 1940 and 1950.  The standard deviation
across states of the changes in participation is 5.6 percentage points.  That reflects increases in
participation rates of several percentage points in some North Central states, along with large
declines in some New England and Southern states.  Changes in participation varied a great deal
within regions as well.  The goal here is to understand how much of the sharp divergence in
participation trends across states can be attributed to differences in OAA benefit growth.
                                                                                                                                                        
adjusted uniformly for all states; but the pattern of the break could be correlated with labor supply behavior.
25  Clague (1947) noted that unusually high levels of participation among older men following World War II still
persisted in 1947, although they had receded among older women.
26  Participation rates by state appear in Appendix Table 2.  Census summary reports indicate that the
participation rate for men 60 and over was 54.7%  in 1940 and 54.5% in 1950 (Ransom and Sutch).12
However, these patterns do raise concerns that benefit determination was endogenous with
participation.  I will discuss evidence against this hypothesis after presenting the main results.
III.  EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND DATA
The empirical model in this paper will take the following form:
LFPist= f (b*log(OAAst)+ Xist*g + Xist*log(OAAst)*d+Yst*f 
                 + ss*states + tt*yeart + eist ) (2)
Equation (2) will be estimated as a probit.  The index i refers to the individual, s to his state of
residence, and t to the year.  LFP takes a value of one if the individual participates in the labor
force and zero if he does not.  Labor force participation may be influenced by individual
characteristics X; time-varying state characteristics Y; state-varying time-constant characteristics;
time-varying national characteristics; and the generosity of OAA.
27  The use of state specific
intercepts means that the effect of OAA will be identified from the variation in OAA benefits
within states across years – the hypothesis being that states with a bigger increase in OAA benefits
should have a bigger drop in labor force participation.
Equation (2) will be estimated on individuals from the 1% Census samples of the 1940 and
1950 Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS).
28  Elements of X include dummies for
age, education, marital status, household composition, farm residence, urban residence, nativity,
and race.  Since income and wealth data are lacking for much of the sample, elements of Y include
measures of states’ economic conditions:  per capita income, manufacturing production, farm
values, and the unemployment rate.
The sample includes all male citizens between the ages of 66 and 75 who are not in group
or institutional quarters.
29  Sample statistics are reported in Table 4 for 25,426 observations in
                                               
27  Parsons (1991) estimated a similar relationship with state level data.  Right-hand side variables were the share
of full-time workers in poverty, the share of individuals aged 65+ who were 75+, the growth rate of the male
population aged 25-35, the share of workers employed in agriculture, and the average farm value.
28  Ruggles and Sobek (1995).
29  According to the Social Security Bulletin (1944), twenty-six states restricted benefits to citizens.13
1940 and 29,422 observations in 1950.  Compared to today, elderly men were somewhat less
racially mixed, more foreign born, less educated and lived more rurally.  Relative to 1940, the 1950
sample was older and more educated and lived less on farms and more in SMAs.
The dependent variable will be whether someone was in the labor force last week. Labor
force participation fell one percentage point, while the employment rate actually rose one
percentage point.
30  The proportion reporting they were out of the labor force for reasons besides
being unable to work rose ten percentage points, a much larger change than in participation.  This
trend suggests that the modern concept of retirement – retirement for leisure, or retirement as a
31  Most working respondents worked full-time or more,
making it reasonable to focus on retirement instead of the choice of hours.
TABLE 4
Sample Means (Standard Deviations), Census Data
1940 1950
Number of Observations 25,426 29,422
Age between:
   66-70 0.611 0.597
   71-75 0.389 0.403
Married 0.707 0.734
                                               
30  Labor force participation is defined as being at work, with a job but not at work, in the armed forces, or
unemployed.  Results with the employment rate on the left-hand side yield at least as strong conclusions about
OAA, as discussed in Section IV.
31  People were also asked why they were not working:  because they were in school, doing housework, unable to,
or other.  The increasing prevalence of “retirement” – not working but not because one is unable to – is not fully
explained by OAA and will be the focus of future research.14
Head of household 0.837 0.850
Lives on a farm 0.283 0.190
Lives in an SMA 0.458 0.508
Foreign born 0.186 0.198
Nonwhite 0.079 0.075
Years of schooling completed 7.01 (3.70) 7.29 (3.88)
   0-8 years 0.803 0.745
   9-11 years 0.065 0.089
   12 years 0.062 0.083
   13-15 years 0.033 0.037
   16 or more years 0.037 0.046
Years of schooling unknown* 0 0.663
Hours worked last week 19.5 (24.8) 18.9 (23.6)
   Hours worked | hours>0 46.2 (14.9) 42.6 (15.9)
Labor force activity:
   In the labor force 0.497 0.487
      With a job 0.460 0.470
      Unemployed 0.037 0.018
   Not in the labor force 0.503 0.513
      Because unable to work 0.352 0.258
      For another reason 0.152 0.254
Sample:  of male citizens aged 66-75, not in institutional or group quarters, from the IPUMS of the Censuses of
1940 and 1950.  To make the statistics nationally representative, education data are weighted by the sample line
person weights, and other sample means are weighted by the person weights.                                                      
*
Only asked of sample line respondents in 1950.
Table 5 reports labor force participation rates of different groups within the population.
Participation declined with age but was higher at all ages than today.  Participation rates were
higher for those who were married, household heads, farm dwellers, non-SMA dwellers, natives,
and nonwhites.  Participation rates increased with education, as it does today.  Most of the
differences in participation across groups narrowed during the decade, especially for nonwhites.
TABLE 515
Labor Force Participation, Percent
1940 1950
Labor Force Participation 49.7 48.7
Age 66-70 57.6 56.6
Age 71-75 37.3 37.1
Married 55.1 52.9
Head of household 54.0 51.8
Lives on a farm 68.2 68.4
Lives in an SMA 46.3 47.4
Foreign born 44.7 46.6
Nonwhite 53.0 48.3
Years of schooling completed
   0-8 years 47.6 45.2
   9-11 years 55.4 50.0
   12 years 56.9 52.0
   13-15 years 56.4 56.3
   16 or more years 66.4 59.2
See the notes to Table 4.
Program data appear in the Social Security Bulletin.  The average OAA benefit divides
total dollar obligations, excluding administrative and overhead costs, by the number of recipients.
The CPI is used to deflate benefit levels.  Additional state level data employed in the estimation
appear in the Statistical Abstract and are reported in Appendix Table 4.
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section I present estimates of the effect of OAA on labor force participation and
offer evidence against the potential endogeneity of state benefit levels.  I also discuss the
implications of the estimates for early expansions in Social Security, and I conclude by analyzing
how OAA affected people with different personal characteristics.
A.  Estimates of OAA’s Impact16
Table 6 reports a series of probit estimates of equation (2).  In column (1) with no other
covariates, the probit coefficient is significant and negative, demonstrating the strong negative
correlation of OAA benefits and labor force participation in the raw data.  Its magnitude is easier
to interpret by considering the resulting prediction of aggregate participation in 1950 if benefits
had stayed at 1940 levels, reported at the bottom of the table.
32  The estimate in column (1) implies
that labor force participation would have been 50.3% in 1950, instead of falling to 48.7%, if OAA
benefits had not been raised 19.7% between 1940 and 1950 – so participation would have risen
instead of falling.
Column (2) adds state and year fixed effects, which control flexibly for factors which vary
across states and which influence labor force participation.  The fixed effects might proxy for
unmeasured individual characteristics which vary across states and for local economic conditions.
The impact of OAA is now identified from changes in benefit levels within states between 1940
and 1950.  The estimated fixed effects are jointly highly significant and raise the estimate of OAA’s
impact, although not significantly.  They raise the standard error of the estimate, which is not
surprising since analysis of variance reveals that the state effects absorb 86.1% of the variation in
OAA benefits, and the year effect absorbs 7.4%.  Even with only 5.5% of residual variance of
OAA benefits left to explain participation, the coefficient estimate remains statistically significant at
better than a 99% confidence level.
TABLE 6
Probit Results
Dependent variable:  In the labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4)












                                               
32  The probit coefficients are used to predict the probability of participation for each individual in 1950, with
benefits switched to their 1940 levels.  The probabilities are averaged over the sample, using person weights to
make them nationally representative, yielding the predicted participation rate reported in the table.17
State average farm value ($1,000) 0.017
(0.006)
Log state per capita income 0.311
(0.121)












Includes state and year effects?
 † No    Yes
[303]
   Yes
[394]
   Yes
[267]
Includes demographic variables and
interactions with OAA?*
 †
No No    Yes
[97]
   Yes
[97]
Predicted labor force participation in 1950,
with benefit levels of 1940
‡
 50.3% 51.1% 49.9% 50.1%
Actual labor force participation in 1940: 49.7%
Actual labor force participation in 1950: 48.7%
Dependent variable: the person participated in the labor force.  Sample: males aged 66-75; see the notes to Table 4.
N=54,848.  Person weights make the estimates nationally representative.  Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.                                                                                                                                                *
Dummies for age, education (9-11, 12, 13-15, 16+ years of school), marital status (widowed/divorced, never
married), not household head (father/father-in-law of head, other relative, not related to head), farm residence,
SMA residence (central city, other SMA), foreign birth, and nonwhite race.  OAA is interacted with all except age.
†  Test statistics for the joint significance are reported in brackets.  In all cases, the p-value is smaller than 0.0005.
‡  Average over people in 1950 of their predicted probabilities of labor force participation when benefits are set at
1940 instead of 1950 levels, while no other variables change.
The fixed effects will not capture influences on participation which shift within states over
time, and which could be endogenous with benefits.  Therefore, columns (3) and (4) add additional
regressors that are available to control for individual and state level characteristics.  Column (3)
includes individual level demographic characteristics such as age dummies, education, and
household characteristics.  The individual level controls are allowed to have different effects in
1940 and 1950.
33  More importantly, the individual variables, except for age, are interacted with
                                               
33  Jointly restricting the coefficients to be the same in both years is rejected at better than 0.001.  Coefficient
estimates are reported in Appendix Table 3.18
the OAA benefit, which allows the impact of OAA to vary across groups in the population.  The
interaction terms, which will be analyzed in more detail later, are jointly highly significant and
improve the fit of the estimation considerably.  With the interaction terms, the coefficient on log
benefits in (3) only describes OAA’s effect on individuals with the most common characteristics:
eight or fewer years of schooling, married, household head, not living on a farm or in a SMA,
native born, and white.  Taken together, the estimates imply a slightly smaller effect on
participation from the increase in OAA benefits between 1940 and 1950, which suggests that the
cross-state variation in demographics is correlated with changes in benefits.
Column (4) adds controls for other state level factors which vary over time and might be
related both to participation and benefits.  In particular, comprehensive earnings, income, and
wealth data is lacking for the sample.  State level measures of economic activity can proxy for
missing individual data on wages, which should raise participation; and for family income and
wealth and the wage available to other family members, which should reduce participation.
Column (4) includes state level economic variables for the manufacturing value added per capita,
average farm values, log per capita income, and the unemployment rate.  The coefficients on the
first three are positive and large and indicate that states with greater gains in economic activity had
smaller declines, or greater increases, in participation.  For example, manufacturing value added
per capita rose by 79% between 1940 and 1950; if it had not risen at all, participation would have
fallen to 45.1% in 1950 instead of 48.7%, according to the estimates.  It is a key finding that
economic growth during the 1940s did not yet produce wealth effects that spurred earlier
retirement, but apparently generated substitution effects that raised the rewards to staying in the
labor force.
Adding the state level economic variables raises the estimate of OAA’s impact but not
significantly, so the measures of economic activity do not appear to be strongly correlated with
benefit levels.  The estimates in column (4) imply that, if benefits in 1950 had stayed at 1940 levels,
labor force participation would have risen from 49.7% in 1940 to 50.1% in 1950. Participation
actually dropped to 48.7%, so it would have been 2.9% higher without the increase in OAA19
benefits.  In those states with large increases in benefits – more than 50% in ten states and 33-50%
in seven others – the resulting declines in participation are sizable.  Therefore, OAA had a
substantial impact on retirement, acting as a counterpoint to other economic forces which were
encouraging people to work longer.
34
B.  Endogenous Legislation
Endogenous benefit levels would make the estimates reported here inconsistent.  OAA
benefits and participation may be associated not because rising benefits induced people to leave the
labor force, but instead because rising retirement rates led states to raise support levels in response.
Yet, it is difficult to come up with useful and available instruments to control for potentially
endogenous benefits.
An alternative is to test whether OAA is correlated with trends in labor force participation
for other people who are ineligible for OAA.  I estimated the same model for slightly younger men,
aged 55-59.  This group should not respond to OAA, but the labor market conditions they face are
likely to be linked to those of older men.  The hypothesis that changes in benefits drove changes in
participation, and not that changes in labor market conditions led policymakers to adjust benefit
levels, would be reflected in coefficients close to zero on log benefits and its interaction terms.
Estimates of a probit analogous to column (4), but with 55-59 year olds, yields a coefficient
on the OAA main effect of 0.077 (0.175), slightly positive and highly insignificant.
35 The aggregate
effect, incorporating the OAA interaction terms, also reflects no relationship between OAA and
labor force participation for 55-59 year olds.  These results support the hypothesis that OAA
benefits were not influenced by labor market conditions.
                                               
34  The qualitative results are similar if the recipiency rate is included along with log benefits, but the variables
are collinear, making it difficult to sort out their impact on participation.
35  The participation rate for this group fell from 89.9% to 88.9% and would have fallen to 88.8% if not for the
increase in OAA benefits, according to the estimates.  The conclusions are the same for 50-54 and 60-64 year
olds also, although the latter could be expected to retire earlier in response to OAA, through a wealth effect.  The
sample selection criteria are alike except that only those in the self-weighting subsample are included for
computational ease.20
The results suggest a further check on the OAA estimates.  If 55-59 year olds are a
reasonable comparison group for the older group eligible for OAA, then the two samples can be
combined.  Including the OAA ineligibles allows state-year interactions to be identified separately
from the effect of benefits, which controls more directly for the possibility that changes in benefits
are endogenous with changes in participation.  The state-year interactions account for influences
on participation that varied over time within states.  Changes in participation for 55-59 year olds
identify the general trends in participation within states, which might have been correlated with
benefit changes.  Additional changes that only occur for OAA eligibles remain to identify the direct
impact of OAA on participation.  The strategy presumes that the labor supply of 55-59 year olds is
otherwise similar to the labor supply of OAA eligibles – except for age effects (both main effects
and interactions with year and state) and except for the systematic influence of OAA.  The
“difference-in-difference-in-differences” estimator employing within state control groups has been


































 † No  Yes
[96]
No No
Predicted labor force participation in 1950,
with benefit levels of 1940
50.1% 53.1% 49.7% 48.2%
                                               
36  For example, Yelowitz (1995) on Medicaid and Gruber (1994) on mandated maternity benefits.21
Actual labor force participation in 1940: 49.7% 52.6% 49.4% 46.0%
Actual labor force participation in 1950: 48.7% 51.4% 48.8% 47.0%
Variations on the probit estimated in column (4).  See the notes to Table 6.
(5):  Includes 55-59 and 66-73 year olds.  Adds fixed effects for state*year, state*age, and year*age.  The
demographic variables have a different effect by age group and year.  Sample selection criteria are the same as for
Table 6, except only people from the self-weighting sample are selected.  N=83,322.                                            
†
The test statistic for joint significance is reported in brackets.  The p-value is 0.0001.                                      (6):
Same as (4), except nonwhites are excluded from the sample.  N=50,120.                                                 (7): Same
as (4), except the left-hand side variable is the employment rate, not the labor force participation rate.
Column (5) of Table 7 reports the results with state*year fixed effects.  Because of limits in
computing capacity, the sample is restricted to 66-73 year olds, together with
the 55-59 year olds.
37  The state*year interactions are jointly highly significant, as are the state*age
interactions, while the age*year interactions are not significant.  Those results imply that cross-
state differences in labor force participation varied over time and also by age, but that age-related
patterns were similar over time.  The coefficient on the OAA main effect increases to -0.222
(0.162) instead of declining, as would be expected if benefits were set endogenously.  The OAA
main effect is statistically significant only at a confidence level of 83%, but the OAA interaction
terms remain jointly significant at greater than 99% confidence.  The boost in the OAA coefficient
carries through in the aggregate:  the participation rate of 66-73 year olds fell from 52.6% in 1940
to 51.4% in 1950 but would have risen to 53.1% if benefits had not been raised.  Therefore,
including the 55-59 year olds in the estimation supports the conclusion of a strong effect of OAA
on participation and suggests that OAA benefits were not set in response to changes in labor force
participation.
C.  Implications for Social Security
Researchers have had surprising difficulty connecting the tremendous growth in the Social
Security program to rising retirement rates.  Although the estimates in this paper are derived from
                                               
37  For 66-73 year olds alone, the coefficient on the OAA main effect, analogous to column (4), is -0.212 (0.089).
The estimates imply that their participation rate would have risen to 53.0% in 1950 if OAA benefits had not been22
OAA, they offer a means to extrapolate to Social Security’s impact on early retirement trends.
Both OAA and Social Security were earnings tested income transfers with similar benefit levels
until later in the 1950s, when real Social Security benefits rose 50.4%.
38
Still, the programs differ along other important dimensions.  First, OAA was available to all
elderly; Social Security covered only about 70% of workers in 1950, and expanded to almost
complete coverage over the next decade.
39  That factor makes predictions about the resulting
change in participation a lower bound.  Second, OAA was completely means and wealth tested,
while Social Security was only earnings tested.
40  The tighter means testing on OAA again implies
that its estimated impact can be interpreted as a lower bound on Social Security’s impact.  A
worker considering retiring and receiving Social Security might not even qualify for OAA,
depending on his non-labor income and wealth.  However, the ambiguity due to the average benefit
measure which must be used here makes it difficult to adjust for this effect.
The estimates from column (3) were used to simulate a 50.4% increase in benefit levels.
Such an increase in benefits is predicted to lower labor force participation of 66-75 year olds from
48.7% observed in 1950 to 45.7% predicted in 1960, a 6.2% decline.  Rescaling the estimate by
100/70 to account for the expansion in Social Security coverage suggests a 8.8% decline.  In fact,
the actual participation rate dropped precipitously to 35.3%.  Naturally, other factors in the 1950s,
such as expanding pension coverage and increasing prosperity – which might have begun to induce
wealth effects on labor supply – are likely to have influenced retirement rates.  Still, because the
simulation is likely to be a lower bound, it suggests that Social Security accounted for at least one-
third of the decline.
                                                                                                                                                        
raised.
38  The average retiree benefit rose 10.5% during the 1940s to $307 in 1950 (in 1940 dollars), compared to $289
for OAA.  The programs grew less comparable by the 1960s, as Social Security lowered the eligibility age to 62
and liberalized the earnings test.  Also, lacking data to decompose OAA’s effect into income and substitution
elasticities, it is more difficult to project to the impact of Social Security in later years.
39  In 1940, only commerce and industry workers – 22.9 of 45.2 million total – were covered by Social Security.
By 1950, 40.1 of 56.2 million workers were covered, and most others gained coverage by 1960.
40  Both programs had implicit tax rates of 100%, but Social Security exempted some earnings.  The monthly
exemption was $15 until 1952 – compared to median monthly wage and salary income of $73 in 1940.23
The evidence about OAA is broadly in line with conclusions from Costa (1995).  Exploiting
policy variation in the incentive to retire, as in this paper, Costa estimated a sizable income
elasticity of retirement for elderly Union Army veterans.  Her estimate implies that subsequent
increases in per capita income and wealth might explain sixty percent of the decline in elderly labor
force participation between 1900 and 1980.  Costa further noted that most other estimates of
retirement elasticities, based on data from the 1970s on, are much smaller, and she suggested that
the income elasticity of retirement might have fallen over time.
41  Another possible explanation is
simply that the sort of policy variation which she uses for identification yields more conclusive
results.
D.  Additional Results
This section exploits the individual level data available in the Censuses to show that some
groups of the population were more sensitive to OAA than others.  It may not be obvious, though,
why the impact of OAA should differ across demographic groups.  We do expect OAA to have a
bigger impact on individuals with a lower wage.  Also, because it is fully means tested, those with
greater non-labor income or wealth should be less sensitive to OAA.  However, with earnings and
wealth data lacking for much of the sample, a feasible alternative is to allow OAA to vary with
other observable characteristics which are likely to be correlated with earnings and other family
resources.  The resulting coefficients indicate which groups of the population responded most to
rising OAA benefits.  Table 8 reports the coefficients from column (4) on the demographic
characteristics interacted with OAA benefits.  Although many of the estimated coefficients are not
individually significant because of relatively small cell sizes, some interesting patterns emerge.
                                               
41  Costa also recognizes that later estimates, generally based on Social Security or disability insurance, might not
be entirely comparable.  One reason is that they often implicitly combine income and substitution effects, as is the
case with the OAA estimates here.24
The education terms are of particular interest because of the strong link between education
and earnings.  The expected relationship is reflected for those with twelve years of school, who
were much less sensitive to OAA than those with only 0-8 years of school and, in all likelihood,
poorer earnings opportunities.  The coefficient on the interaction term of 0.131 (0.077), compared
to the coefficient on the OAA main effect of -0.188 (0.085), implies that those with a high school
education were about one-third as sensitive to OAA as those who did not attend high school.  The
other education coefficients are far from significant, however.
The connection to household composition is also interesting.  The interaction terms
indicate that someone who was not the household head, but related to the head, was insensitive to
OAA.  Meanwhile, those who were neither household heads nor related to the head were about as
sensitive to OAA as those who were themselves household heads.  This is likely to reflect the
determination of benefit eligibility and levels, which was meant to take into account the support
available from kin.  It suggests that household status was the principal means for detecting or
enforcing kin support.  Furthermore, the greater sensitivity of household heads to OAA
compounds the impact on participation of changes in household composition, since the
participation of household heads fell from 54.0% in 1940 to 51.8% in 1950, while household
headship rose from 83.7% to 85.0%.  The rise in household headship further implies that the link
between household structure and OAA recipiency may have raised the propensity of the elderly to
maintain their own households.
42
TABLE 8
Additional Coefficients from Probit (4), Table 6
Demographic characteristics interacted with log annual OAA benefit
OAA main effect     -0.188  (0.085)
9-11 years of school -0.074
(0.074)
Lives in central city of SMA 0.046
(0.053)
                                               
42  Costa (1997) found that OAA generosity contributed significantly to the major trend towards nonmarried
elderly woman living alone instead of living with kin.25
12 years of school 0.131
(0.077)




13-15 years of school -0.006
(.105)
16+ years of school -0.103
(0.113)
Lives on a farm 0.070
(0.041)














Not related to household head -0.001
(0.085)
See the notes to Table 6.
The estimates also indicate that farm residents were more than a third less sensitive to OAA
than the rest of the population.  This is consistent with Fisher (1946), who reported that, while
22% of the aged population were farm residents in 1940, only 16% of OAA recipients were farm
residents in the twenty-two states studied in 1944.  The lower levels of OAA recipiency among
farm residents might arise because they had higher assets or household income precluding
eligibility.
43  Another possibility is that individuals left the farm when they retired and began to
receive benefits, in which case the increase in benefits might have contributed to the move away
from farms.
Lastly, nonwhites exhibit the greatest sensitivity of any group to OAA, along with the
largest decline in participation during the decade.  Part of the explanation is, no doubt, much lower
income and wealth levels among racial minorities.  Another factor might be declining labor demand
in the South associated with the mechanization of cotton picking in the 1940s, work which had
                                               
43  Fisher reported that rural states tended to have higher levels of OAA recipiency than urban states, so it does26
been largely done by blacks.  This pattern might raise concerns that changing labor demand was
correlated with changing state benefit levels, which would be reflected in the labor supply estimates
here.
44  For that reason, I re-estimated the relationship with whites only, as reported in column (6)
of Table 7.  The coefficient is almost identical and the conclusions about OAA are unchanged
when nonwhites are excluded from the sample.
One last specification explores how OAA affects the employment rate, rather than the labor
force participation rate.  Focusing on participation supposes that job seekers did not receive OAA,
perhaps because the process of applying for OAA was costly or because a job seeker was less
likely to be deemed eligible.  But if, instead, job seekers tended to receive OAA until they found
employment, then the impact of OAA would be felt on employment rates more directly than on
participation rates.  A specification with the employment rate on the left hand side is reported in
column (7) of Table 7.  The estimated magnitude of the OAA main effect turns out to be quite
similar, as does the aggregate impact of OAA.  The aggregate employment rate rose by one
percentage point, from 46.0% to 47.0%, between 1940 and 1950. The estimates suggest that if
benefits had not risen, then the employment rate would have risen further to 48.2%, an additional
1.2 percentage points. Thus, the conclusions about OAA are as strong, whether considering its
impact on the employment rate or the participation rate.
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper explores whether the Old Age Assistance program, the first means tested
transfer program for the elderly, induced individuals to retire from work.  OAA was strongly
means-tested, benefit levels were generous relative to income levels of the day, and OAA
recipiency rates were high.  Using individual records from the 1940 and 1950 Censuses, I estimate
a substantial effect of OAA on labor force participation.  Yet, economists have had trouble
attributing the much larger decline in participation that followed to Social Security, even though
                                                                                                                                                        
not appear that access to the OAA program was more limited in rural areas.
44  Quadagno (1988) also noted that OAA benefits in the South appeared to be deliberately set lower for blacks at
times.27
Social Security came to be received by most of the population.  A major problem in quantifying the
impact of Social Security or pensions on retirement arises because benefit levels do not vary across
the population randomly but depend on past earnings.  Similar difficulties have hindered
investigation of the current Supplemental Security Income program for the poor elderly.  Studying
OAA gets around this problem because benefit levels varied across states.  The impact of OAA is
estimated here from the relationship of changes in participation to changes in benefit generosity
within states between 1940 and 1950.  The conclusion is that the growth of means tested transfers
for the elderly played a significant role in the trend towards earlier retirement.
The estimates suggest that participation would have risen slightly, instead of falling, if not
for the 20% increase in real OAA benefits between 1940 and 1950.  The incentive to withdraw
from the labor force remained even while the prospering economy acted to encourage individuals
to stay in the labor force, mitigating the decline in participation.  Additional data on slightly
younger men offers evidence that benefits were not set endogenously with labor supply trends.
The impact of expansions in the generosity of Social Security during the following decade is
consequently predicted to be large, explaining at least one-third of the decline in participation
during the 1950s.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1:  OAA Data by State










   Maine 258.83 17.3% 496.08 7.4% 16.1%
   New Hampshire 257.22 11.9% 510.46 11.2% 12.9%
   Vermont 191.84 15.8% 407.71 19.1% 17.3%
   Massachusetts 344.42 23.1% 743.62 21.0% 21.5%
   Rhode Island 233.90 12.5% 538.48 29.0% 14.7%
   Connecticut 322.60 13.3% 663.05 15.2% 11.1%
Middle Atlantic
   New York 306.69 12.9% 627.99 14.7% 9.6%
   New Jersey 248.52 11.2% 564.95 27.4% 6.2%
   Pennsylvania 264.64 14.5% 460.42 -2.5% 10.4%
East North Central
   Ohio 279.58 22.8% 554.34 11.1% 17.7%
   Indiana 216.07 23.0% 421.80 9.4% 14.5%
   Illinois 251.47 24.3% 520.62 16.0% 16.7%
   Michigan 202.83 22.2% 542.92 50.0% 21.7%
   Wisconsin 268.89 21.3% 494.91 3.1% 17.0%
West North Central
   Minnesota 257.71 29.6% 537.46 16.9% 20.7%
   Iowa 251.07 24.2% 578.54 29.1% 18.1%
   Missouri 193.11 28.3% 505.51 46.7% 32.3%
   North Dakota 201.31 22.4% 563.23 56.8% 18.6%
   South Dakota 236.71 33.2% 462.57 9.5% 22.0%
   Nebraska 198.24 26.3% 520.52 47.1% 18.3%
   Kansas 234.28 17.3% 591.97 41.6% 20.1%
South Atlantic
   Delaware 134.03 13.1% 327.24 36.8% 6.4%
   Maryland 211.92 15.0% 424.96 12.4% 7.4%
   D.C. 307.78 8.1% 485.41 -11.6% 5.0%
   Virginia 117.67 11.3% 242.03 15.3% 9.2%
   West Virginia 166.37 17.6% 293.01 -1.3% 19.3%32









   North Carolina 121.70 22.8% 248.02 14.2% 27.3%
   South Carolina 98.81 24.3% 262.40 48.8% 36.6%
   Georgia 96.02 17.8% 256.65 49.8% 46.1%
   Florida 144.11 26.8% 464.15 80.5% 29.2%
East South Central
   Kentucky 104.90 25.7% 231.59 23.7% 28.7%
   Tennessee 120.88 23.5% 354.10 64.2% 27.9%
   Alabama 112.54 14.6% 240.34 19.7% 40.9%
   Mississippi 99.86 18.6% 216.87 21.7% 42.9%
West South Central
   Arkansas 90.51 18.4% 271.89 68.3% 44.8%
   Louisiana 142.65 26.8% 565.45 122.1% 68.1%
   Oklahoma 212.62 50.2% 599.84 58.1% 52.0%
   Texas 123.77 34.1% 399.53 80.9% 43.8%
Mountain
   Montana 216.84 33.6% 609.49 57.5% 23.2%
   Idaho 263.29 28.2% 545.39 16.1% 26.3%
   Wyoming 285.63 27.1% 652.58 28.0% 23.3%
   Colorado 405.03 47.6% 812.06 12.4% 43.7%
   New Mexico 173.99 19.3% 415.46 33.8% 30.2%
   Arizona 336.28 34.0% 571.84 -4.7% 30.2%
   Utah 254.27 45.1% 550.32 21.3% 23.9%
   Nevada 316.90 33.4% 619.73 9.6% 24.2%
Pacific
   Washington 265.77 27.2% 767.48 61.8% 34.9%
   Oregon 256.61 20.7% 610.04 33.2% 17.9%
   California 455.48 25.5% 843.36 3.8% 29.9%
National Average 241 21.8% 515 19.7% 22.7%
Standard Deviation 92 7.9% 166 27.0% 13.4%33
Average benefit=transfers divided by recipients.  Recipiency rate=recipients divided by 65-plus population.  The standard
deviation of benefits and recipiency rates are weighted by state population.  Source:  Social Security Bulletin, various
issues.34
 APPENDIX TABLE 2:  Labor Force Participation Rates
1940 1950 Change
New England
   Maine 53.9% 41.6% -12.3
   New Hampshire 44.4% 56.8% 12.4
   Vermont 62.9% 44.0% -18.9
   Massachusetts 47.6% 45.6% -2.0
   Rhode Island 55.2% 53.1% -2.0
   Connecticut 54.2% 52.0% -2.3
Middle Atlantic
   New York 48.8% 52.0% 3.2
   New Jersey 47.7% 48.5% 0.8
   Pennsylvania 49.1% 46.6% -2.5
East North Central
   Ohio 44.1% 50.6% 6.5
   Indiana 50.9% 58.0% 7.1
   Illinois 44.0% 50.4% 6.5
   Michigan 52.8% 49.9% -2.9
   Wisconsin 46.7% 49.3% 2.7
West North Central
   Minnesota 46.9% 52.1% 5.2
   Iowa 47.3% 50.9% 3.6
   Missouri 55.2% 50.8% -4.5
   North Dakota 53.8% 67.0% 13.2
   South Dakota 55.7% 54.8% -0.9
   Nebraska 47.9% 52.9% 5.1
   Kansas 49.0% 54.6% 5.6
South Atlantic
   Delaware 57.2% 56.9% -0.3
   Maryland 46.7% 51.3% 4.6
   D.C. 36.5% 39.5% 3.0
   Virginia 60.7% 55.8% -4.8
   West Virginia 49.3% 48.1% -1.235
1940 1950 Change
   North Carolina 64.4% 54.8% -9.6
   South Carolina 62.0% 53.9% -8.0
   Georgia 57.3% 51.5% -5.8
   Florida 41.7% 33.5% -8.2
East South Central
   Kentucky 56.5% 50.1% -6.4
   Tennessee 55.8% 49.3% -6.5
   Alabama 56.0% 51.5% -4.5
   Mississippi 63.4% 60.2% -3.2
West South Central
   Arkansas 61.3% 50.8% -10.5
   Louisiana 50.0% 32.8% -17.2
   Oklahoma 46.2% 41.6% -4.6
   Texas 49.8% 49.3% -0.4
Mountain
   Montana 50.9% 48.6% -2.3
   Idaho 58.6% 48.0% -10.6
   Wyoming 47.5% 61.3% 13.8
   Colorado 37.7% 38.0% 0.4
   New Mexico 48.1% 54.7% 6.6
   Arizona 47.1% 41.2% -5.9
   Utah 51.8% 54.3% 2.5
   Nevada 54.5% 53.9% -0.5
Pacific
   Washington 45.0% 44.7% -0.3
   Oregon 50.2% 50.6% 0.4
   California 40.2% 35.4% -4.7
National 49.7% 48.7% -1.0
Male citizens 66-75, not institutionalized or in group quarters, from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Samples for the 1940 and 1950 Censuses.  Labor force participation last week is
calculated as those at work, with a job but not at work, in the armed forces, or unemployed, divided
by the population. Data are weighted by the person weights to make them nationally representative.36
APPENDIX TABLE 3:  Additional Coefficients from Probit (4), Table 6
Dependent variable:  In the labor force
x1940 x1950




























































Fixed effect - -0.134
(0.082)37





















Additional coefficients from the probit estimated in column (4), Table 6.  See notes to Table 6.  State effects were
included as well.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
APPENDIX TABLE 4:  Sample Means of State Level Variables (Standard Deviation)
1940 1950
Manufacturing value added per capita 186  (101) 333  (164)
Average farm value 6940  (7129) 9614  (8373)
Per capita income 595  (202) 835  (185)
Unemployment rate 9.6  (2.7) 4.8  (1.5)
Source:  Statistical Abstract, various years.  Variables are expressed in 1940 dollars, deflated by the CPI
(1950=178.8).  The sample standard deviations are weighted by state population.